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Abstract
One major factor impeding more widespread adoption of
deep neural networks (DNNs) is their lack of robustness,
which is essential for safety-critical applications such as au-
tonomous driving. This has motivated much recent work on
adversarial attacks for DNNs, which mostly focus on pixel-
level perturbations void of semantic meaning. In contrast, we
present a general framework for adversarial attacks on trained
agents, which covers semantic perturbations to the environ-
ment of the agent performing the task as well as pixel-level
attacks. To do this, we re-frame the adversarial attack prob-
lem as learning a distribution of parameters that always fools
the agent. In the semantic case, our proposed adversary (de-
noted as BBGAN) is trained to sample parameters that de-
scribe the environment with which the black-box agent inter-
acts, such that the agent performs its dedicated task poorly
in this environment. We apply BBGAN on three different
tasks, primarily targeting aspects of autonomous navigation:
object detection, self-driving, and autonomous UAV racing.
On these tasks, BBGAN can generate failure cases that con-
sistently fool a trained agent.
Introduction
As a result of recent advances in machine learning and com-
puter vision, deep neural networks (DNNs) are now inter-
leaved with many aspects of our daily lives. DNNs suggest
news articles to read and movies to watch, automatically
edit our photos and videos, and translate between hundreds
of languages. They are also bound to disrupt transportation
with autonomous driving slowly becoming a reality. While
there are already impressive demos and some successful de-
ployments, safety concerns for boundary conditions persist.
While current models work very well on average, they strug-
gle with robustness in certain cases. Recent work in the ad-
versarial attack literature shows how sensitive DNNs are to
input noise. These attacks usually utilize the information
about the network structure to perform gradient updates in
order to derive targeted perturbations (coined white-box at-
tacks). These perturbations are injected into the input im-
age at the pixel-level, so as to either confuse the network or
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Figure 1: Semantic Adversarial Diagnostic Attacks. Neural net-
works can perform very well on average for a host of tasks; how-
ever, they do perform poorly or downright fail when encountering
some environments. To diagnose why they fail and how they can be
improved, we seek to learn the underlying distribution of seman-
tic parameters, which generate environments that pose difficulty to
these networks when applied to three safety critical tasks: object
detection, self-driving cars, and autonomous UAV racing.
enforce a specific behavior (Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Carlini and Wagner 2017;
Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016).
In practice, such pixel attacks are less likely to naturally
occur than semantic attacks which include changes in cam-
era viewpoint, lighting conditions, street layouts, etc. The
literature on semantic attacks is much sparser, since they
are much more subtle and difficult to analyze (Alcorn et
al. 2019; Zeng et al. 2019). Yet, this type of attack is crit-
ical to understand/diagnose failure cases that might occur
in the real-world. While it is very difficult to investigate se-
mantic attacks on real data, we can leverage simulation as
a proxy that can unearth useful insights transferable to the
real-world. Figure 1 shows an example of an object misclas-
sified by the YOLOV3 detector (Redmon and Farhadi 2018)
applied to a rendered image from a virtual environment,
an autonomous UAV racing (Li et al. 2018) failure case in
a recently developed general purpose simulator (Sim4CV
(Mu¨ller et al. 2018b)), and an autonomous driving failure
case in a popular driving simulator (CARLA (Dosovitskiy
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et al. 2017)). These failures arise from adversarial attacks
on the semantic parameters of the environment.
In this work, we consider environments that are ade-
quately photo-realistic and parameterized by a compact set
of variables that have direct semantic meaning (e.g. cam-
era viewpoint, lighting/weather conditions, road layout, etc.
). Since the generation process of these environments from
their parameters is quite complicated and in general non-
differentiable, we treat it as a black-box function that can be
queried but not back-propagated through. We seek to learn
an adversary that can produce fooling parameters to con-
struct an environment where the agent (which is also a black-
box) fails in its task. Unlike most adversarial attacks that
generate sparse instances of failure, our proposed adversary
provides a more comprehensive view on how an agent can
fail; we learn the distribution of fooling parameters for a par-
ticular agent and task and then sample from it. Since Gener-
ative Adversarial Networks (GANs (Goodfellow et al. 2014;
Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017)) have emerged as a
promising family of unsupervised learning techniques that
can model high-dimensional distributions, we model our ad-
versary as a GAN, denoted as black-box GAN (BBGAN).
Contributions. (1) We formalize adversarial attacks in a
more general setup to include both semantic and conven-
tional pixel attacks. (2) We propose BBGAN in order to
learn the underlying distribution of semantic adversarial at-
tacks and show promising results on three different safety-
critical applications used in autonomous navigation.
Related Work
Pixel-level Adversarial Attacks
Szegedy et al. formulate attacking neural networks as an op-
timization problem (Szegedy et al. 2013). Their method pro-
duces a minimal perturbation of the image pixels that fools a
trained classifier (incorrect predictions). Several works fol-
lowed the same approach but with different formulations,
such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) and Projected Gradient Descent
(Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016). A comprehensive
study of different ways to fool networks with minimal pixel
perturbation can be found in the paper (Carlini and Wagner
2017). Most efforts use the gradients of the function to op-
timize the input, which might be difficult to obtain in some
cases (Zeng et al. 2019). However, all of these methods are
limited to pixel perturbations to fool trained agents, while
we consider more general cases of attacks, e.g. changes in
camera viewpoint to fool a detector or change in weather
conditions to fool a self-driving car. Furthermore, we are in-
terested in the distribution of the semantic parameters that
fool the agent, more so than individual fooling examples.
Semantic Attacks beyond Pixels
Beyond pixel perturbations, several recent works perform at-
tacks on the object/camera pose to fool a classifier (Alcorn et
al. 2019; Zeng et al. 2019; Hamdi and Ghanem 2019). Other
works proposed attacks on 3D point clouds using Point-Net
(Xiang, Qi, and Li 2019), and on 3D meshes using differen-
tiable functions that describe the scene (Xiao et al. 2019). In-
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Figure 2: Generic Adversarial Attacks on Agents.Eµ is a para-
metric environment with which an agent A interacts. The agent
receives an observation ot from the environment and produces an
action at. The environment scores the agent and updates its state
until the episode finishes. A final score Q(A,Eµ) is given to the
adversary G, which in turn updates itself to propose more adver-
sarial parameters µ for the next episode.
spired by these excellent works, we extend semantic attacks
by using readily available virtual environments with plausi-
ble 3D setups to systematically test trained agents. In fact,
our formulation includes attacks not only on static agents
like object detectors, but also agents that interact with dy-
namic environments, such as self-driving agents. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work to introduce adver-
sarial attacks in CARLA(Dosovitskiy et al. 2017), a standard
autonomous navigation benchmark.
Adversarial Attacks and Reinforcement Learning
Our generic formulation of adversarial attacks is naturally
inspired by RL, in which agents can choose from multiple
actions and receive partial rewards as they proceed in their
task (Sutton and Barto 1998). In RL, the agent is subject to
training in order to achieve a goal in the environment; the
environment can be dynamic to train a more robust agent
(Morimoto and Doya 2001; Pinto et al. 2017; Held et al.
2017). However, in adversarial attacks, the agent is usually
fixed and the adversary is the subject of the optimization in
order to fool the agent. We formulate adversarial attacks in
a general setup where the environment rewards an agent for
some task. An adversary outside the environment is tasked to
fool the agent by modifying the environment and receiving
a score after each episode.
Methodology
Generalizing Adversarial Attacks
Extending attacks to general agents. In this work, we gen-
eralize the adversarial attack setup beyond pixel perturba-
tions. Our more general setup (refer to Figure 2) includes
semantic attacks, e.g. perturbing the camera pose or light-
ing conditions of the environment that generates observa-
tions (e.g. pixels in 2D images). An environment Eµ is
parametrized by µ ∈ [µmin,µmax]d. It has an internal state
st and produces observations ot ∈ Rn at each time step
t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. The environment interacts with a trained
agent A, which gets ot from Eµ and produces actions at.
At each time step t and after the agent performs at, the inter-
nal state of the environment is updated: st+1 = Eµ(st,at).
The environment rewards the agent with rt = R(st ,at),
for some reward function R. We define the episode score
Q(A,Eµ) =
∑T
t=1 rt of all intermediate rewards. The goal
of A is to complete a task by maximizing Q . The adversary
G attacks the agent A by modifying the environment Eµ
through its parameters µ without access to A and Eµ.
Distribution of Adversarial Attacks. We define Pµ′ to be
the fooling distribution of semantic parametersµ′ represent-
ing the environments Eµ′ , which fool the agent A.
µ′ ∼ Pµ′ ⇔ Q(A,Eµ′) ≤ ; µ′ ∈ [µmin,µmax]d (1)
Here,  is a task-specific threshold to determine success and
failure of the agent A. The distribution Pµ′ covers all sam-
ples that result in failure of A. Its PDF is unstructured and
depends on the complexity of the agent. We seek an adver-
saryG that learnsPµ′ , so it can be used to comprehensively
analyze the weaknesses of A. Unlike the common practice
of finding adversarial examples (e.g. individual images), we
address the attacks distribution-wise in a compact seman-
tic parameter space. We denote our analysis technique as
Semantic Adversarial Diagnostic Attack (SADA). Semantic
because of the nature of the environment parameters and di-
agnostic because a fooling distribution is sought. We show
later how this distribution can be used to reveal agents’ fail-
ure modes. We propose to optimize the following objective
for the adversary G to achieve this challenging goal:
arg min
G
Eµ∼G[Q(A,Eµ)]
s.t. {µ : µ ∼ G} = {µ′ : µ′ ∼ Pµ′}
(2)
Algorithm 1 describes a general setup for G to learn to
generate fooling parameters. It also includes a mechanism
for evaluating G in the black-box environment Eµ for L
iterations after training it to attack the agent A. An attack
is considered a fooling attack, if parameter µ sampled from
G achieves an episode score Q(A,Eµ) ≤ . Consequently,
the Attack Fooling Rate (AFR) is defined as the rate at which
samples from G are fooling attacks. In addition to AFR, the
algorithm returns the set Sµ′ of adversarial examples that
can be used to diagnose the agent. The equality constraint in
Eq (2) is very strict to include all fooling parameters µ′ of
the fooling distribution. It acts as a perceptuality metric in
our generalized attack to prevent unrealistic attacks. Next,
we relax this equality constraint to leverage recent advances
in GANs for learning an estimate of the distribution Pµ′ .
Black-Box Generative Adversarial Network
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are a promising
family of unsupervised techniques that can model complex
domains, e.g. natural images (Goodfellow et al. 2014; Ar-
jovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017; Gurumurthy, Kiran Sar-
vadevabhatla, and Venkatesh Babu 2017). GANs consist of a
discriminator Dx and a generator Gx that are adversarially
trained to optimize the loss LGAN (Gx,Dx,PX), where
Algorithm 1: Generic Adversarial Attacks on Agents
Returns: Attack fooling Rate (AFR)
Requires: Agent A, Adversary G, Environment Eµ, number
of episodes T , training iterations L, test size M , fooling
threshold 
Training G: for i← 1 to L do
Sample µi ∼ G and initialize Eµi with initial state s1
for t← 1 to T do
Eµi produces observation ot from st
A performs at(ot) and receives rt ← R(st,at)
State updates: st+1 ← Eµi (st,at)
end
G receives the episode score Qi(A,Eµ)←∑Tt=1 rt
Update G to solve for Eq (2)
end
Testing G: Initialize fooling counter f ← 0
for j ← 1 to M do
sample µj ∼ G and initialize Eµj with initial state s1
for t← 1 to T do
at(ot) ; rt ← R(st,at) ; st+1 ← Eµj (st,at)
end
Qj(A,Eµj )←
∑T
t=1 rt
if Qj(A,Eµj ) ≤  then
f ← f + 1
end
end
Returns: AFR = f/M
PX is the distribution of images in domain X and z ∈ Rc is
a latent random Gaussian vector.
min
Gx
max
Dx
LGAN(Gx,Dx,PX) = (3)
Ex∼px(x)[logDx(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−Dx(Gx(z)))]
Dx tries to determine if a given sample (e.g. image x)
is real (exists in the training dataset) or fake (generated by
Gx). On the other hand, Gx tries to generate samples that
fool Dx (e.g. misclassification). Both networks are proven
to converge when Gx can reliably produce the underlying
distribution of the real samples (Goodfellow et al. 2014).
We propose to learn the fooling distribution Pµ′ using a
GAN setup, which we denote as black-box GAN (BBGAN).
We follow a similar GAN objective but replace the image
domain x by the semantic environment parameter µ. How-
ever, since we do not have direct access to Pµ′ , we propose
a module called the inducer, which is tasked to produce the
induced set Sµ′ that belongs to Pµ′ . In essence, the inducer
tries to choose a parameter set which represents the fooling
distribution to be learnt by the BBGAN as well as possible.
In practice, the inducer selects the best fooling parameters
(based on the Q scores of the agent under these parameters)
from a set of randomly sampled parameters in order to con-
struct this induced set. Thus, this setup relaxes Eq (2) to:
arg min
G
Eµ∼G[Q(A,Eµ)]
s.t. {µ : µ ∼ G} ⊂ {µ′ : µ′ ∼ Pµ′}
(4)
So, the final BBGAN loss becomes:
min
Gµ
max
Dµ
LBBGAN(Gµ,Dµ, Sµ′) =
Eµ∼Sµ′ [logDµ(µ)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(5)
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Figure 3: BBGAN: Learning Fooling Distribution of Semantic Environment Parameters. We learn an adversary G, which samples
semantic parameters µ that parametrize the environment Eµ, such that an agent A fails in a given task in Eµ. The inducer produces the
induced set Sµ′ from a uniformly sampled set Ω by filtering the lowest scoring µ (according to Q value), and passing Sµ′ for BBGAN
training. Note that Q1 ≤ Qs..., ≤ QN , where s =
∣∣Sµ′ ∣∣ , N = |Ω|. The inducer and the discriminator are only used during training
(dashed lines), after which the adversary learns the fooling distribution Pµ′ . Three safety-critical applications are used to demonstrate this in
three virtual environments: object detection (in Blender (Blender Online Community 2018)), self-driving cars (in CARLA (Dosovitskiy et al.
2017)), and autonomous racing UAVs (in Sim4CV (Mu¨ller et al. 2018b)).
Here, Gµ is the generator acting as the adversary, and
z ∈ Rm is a random variable sampled from a normal dis-
tribution. A simple inducer can be just a filter that takes a
uniformly sampled set Ω = {µi ∼ Uni([µmin,µmax])}i=Ni=1
and suggests the lowest Q-scoring µi that satisfies the con-
dition Q(µi) ≤ . The selected samples constitute the in-
duced set Sµ′ . The BBGAN treats the induced set as a train-
ing set, so the samples in Sµ′ act as virtual samples from
the fooling distribution Pµ′ that we want to learn. As the
induced set size Sµ′ increases, the BBGAN learns more of
Pµ′ . As |Sµ′ | → ∞, any sample from Sµ′ is a sample of
Pµ′ and the BBGAN in Eq (5) satisfies the strict condition
in Eq (2). Consequently, sampling from Gµ would consis-
tently fool agent A. We show an empirical proof for this in
the supplement and show how we consistently fool three
different agents by samples from Gµ in the experiments.
The number of samples needed for Sµ′ to be representa-
tive of Pµ′ depends on the dimensionality d of µ. Because
of the black-box and stochastic nature of Eµ and A (simi-
lar to other RL environments), we follow the random sam-
pling scheme common in RL (Mania, Guy, and Recht 2018)
instead of deterministic gradient estimation. In the experi-
ments, we compare our method against baselines that use
different approaches to solve Eq (2).
Special Cases of Adversarial Attacks
One can show that the generic adversarial attack framework
detailed above includes well-known types of attacks as spe-
cial cases, summarized in Table 1. In fact, the general setup
allows for static agents (e.g. classifiers and detectors) as well
as dynamic agents (e.g. an autonomous agent acting in a dy-
namic environment). It also covers pixel-wise image pertur-
bations, as well as, semantic attacks that try to fool the agent
in a more realistic scenario. The generic attack also allows
for a more flexible way to define the attack success based
on an application-specific threshold  and the agent score
Q . In the supplement, we provide more details on the in-
clusiveness of our generic setup and how it covers original
pixel-level adversarial attack objectives.
Applications
Object Detection
Object detection is one of the core perception tasks com-
monly used in autonomous navigation. Based on its suit-
ability for autonomous applications, we choose the very
fast, state-of-the-art YOLOv3 object detector (Redmon and
Farhadi 2018) as the agent in our SADA framework. We use
the open-source software Blender to construct a scene based
on freely available 3D scenes and CAD models. We pick an
urban scene with an open area to allow for different render-
ing setups. The scene includes one object of interest as well
as a camera and main light source directed toward the center
of the object. The light is a fixed strength spotlight located at
a fixed distance from the object. The material of each object
is semi-metallic, which is common for the classes under con-
sideration. The 3D collection consists of 100 shapes of 12
object classes (aeroplane, bench, bicycle, boat, bottle, bus,
car, chair, dining table, motorbike, train, truck) from Pascal-
3D (Xiang, Mottaghi, and Savarese 2014) and ShapeNet
(Chang et al. 2015). At each iteration, one shape from the
intended class is randomly picked and placed in the middle
of the scene. The rendered image is then passed to YOLOV3
for detection. For the environment parameters, we use eight
parameters that have shown to affect detection performance
and frequently occur in real setups (refer to Figure 4).
Attack Variables Pixel Adversarial Attackon Image Classifiers
Semantic Adversarial Attack
on Object Detectors
Semantic Adversarial Attack
on Autonomous Agents
Agent A
K-class classifier
C : [0, 1]n → [l1, l2, ..., lK ]
lj : the softmax value for class j
K-class object detector
F : [0, 1]n → (RN×K ,RN×4)
N : number of detected objects
self-driving policy agent A
e.g. network to regress controls
Parameters µ
the pixels noise
added on attacked image xi
parameters describing the scene
e.g. camera pose, object , light
parameters involved in the simulation
e.g. road shape , weather , camera
Environment Eµ
dataset Φ containing all images
and their true class label
Φ = {(xi, yi)}|Φ|i=1
dataset Φ containing all
images and their true
class label
simulation environment
partially described by µ
that A navigates in for a target
Observation ot
attacked image after added noise
= xi + µ, where x , µ ∈ Rn
the rendered image
using the scene parameters µ
sequence of rendered images A
observes during the simulation episode
Agent actions at(ot)
predicted softmax vector
of attacked image
predicted confidence of
the true class label
steering command to move
the car/UAV in the next step
Score Q(A,Eµ)
the difference between
true and predicted softmax
predicted confidence of
the true class label
the average sum of rewards
over five different episodes
Table 1: Cases of Generic Adversarial Attacks: variable substitutions that lead to known attacks.
z𝜽𝒄𝒂𝒎 𝜽𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕
∅𝒄𝒂𝒎 ∅𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕
Figure 4: Object Detection Attack Setup: (Left): the 100 shapes
from Pascal3D and ShapeNet of 12 object classes, used to uncover
the failure cases of the YOLOV3 detector. (Right): the semantic
parameters µ defining the environment. (z): camera distance to
the object, (φcam, θcam, φlight, φlight): camera azimuth, pitch and light
source azimuth, and pitch angles respectively.
Self-Driving
There is a lot of recent work in autonomous driving espe-
cially in the fields of robotics and computer vision (Franke
2017; Codevilla et al. 2018). In general, complete driving
systems are very complex and difficult to analyze or simu-
late. By learning the underlying distribution of failure cases,
our work provides a safe way to analyze the robustness of
such a complete system. While our analysis is done in simu-
lation only, we would like to highlight that sim-to-real trans-
fer is a very active research field nowadays (Sadeghi and
Levine 2017; Tobin et al. 2017). We use an autonomous driv-
ing agent (based on CIL (Codevilla et al. 2018)), which was
trained on the environment Eµ with default parameters. The
driving-policy was trained end-to-end to predict car controls
given an input image and is conditioned on high-level com-
mands (e.g. turn right at the next intersection). The environ-
ment used is CARLA driving simulator (Dosovitskiy et al.
2017), the most realistic open-source urban driving simula-
tor currently available. We consider the three common tasks
of driving in a straight line, completing one turn, and navi-
gating between two random points. The score is measured as
the average success of five pairs of start and end positions.
Since experiments are time-consuming, we restrict ourselves
to three parameters, two of which pertain to the mounted
Figure 5: Qualitative Examples: (Top): BBGAN generated sam-
ples that fool YOLOV3 detector on the Truck class. (Bottom): BB-
GAN generated tracks that fool the UAV navigation agent.
camera viewpoint and the third controls the appearance of
the environment by changing the weather setting (e.g. ’clear
noon’, ’clear sunset’, ’cloudy after rain’, etc.). As such, we
construct an environment by randomly perturbing the posi-
tion and rotation of the default camera along the z-axis and
around the pitch axis respectively, and by picking one of the
weather conditions. Intuitively, this helps measure the ro-
bustness of the driving policy to the camera position (e.g.
deploying the same policy in a different vehicle) and to en-
vironmental conditions.
UAV Racing
In recent years, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) racing has
emerged as a new sport where pilots compete in navigat-
ing small UAVs through race courses at high speeds. Since
this is a very interesting research problem, it has also been
picked up by the robotics and vision communities (Kauf-
mann et al. 2018). We use a fixed agent to autonomously fly
through each course and measure its success as percentage
of gates passed (Mu¨ller et al. 2018a). If the next gate was not
reached within 10 seconds, we reset the agent at the last gate.
We also record the time needed to complete the course. The
Object Detection Autonomous Driving UAV Track Generation
Bicycle Motorbike Truck 12-class avg Straight One Curve Navigation 3 anchors 4 anchors 5 anchors
Full Set 14.6% 32.5% 56.8% 37.1 % 10.6% 19.5% 46.3% 17.0% 23.5% 15.8%
Random 13.3% 38.8% 73.8% 45.7% 8.0% 18.0% 48.0% 22.0% 30.0% 16.0%
Multi-Class SVM 20.0% 45.6% 70.8% 45.8% 96.0% 100% 100% 24.0% 30.0% 14.0%
GP Regression 17.6% 43.6% 83.6% 45.26% 100% 100% 100% 74.0% 94.0% 44.0%
Gaussian 19.6% 40.4% 72.4% 47.0% 54.0% 30.0% 64.0% 49.3% 56.0% 28.7%
GMM10% 26.0% 48.4% 75.2% 49.0% 90.0% 72.0% 98.0% 57.0% 63.0% 33.0%
GMM50% 16.4% 46.8% 72.0% 47.8% 92.0% 68.0% 100% 54.0% 60.0% 40.0%
Bayesian 48.0% 52.0% 75.6% 56.1% - - - - - -
BBGAN (vanilla) 44.0% 45.2% 90.8% 74.5% 100% 98.0% 98.0% 42.0% 94.0% 86.0%
BBGAN (boost) 65.8% 82.0% 100% 80.5% 100% 100% 100% 86.0% 98.0% 92.0%
Table 2: Attack Fooling Rate (AFR) Comparison: AFR of adversarial samples generated on three safety-critical applications: YOLOV3
object detection, self-driving, and UAV racing. For detection, we report the average AFR performance across all 12 classes and highlight 3
specific ones. For autonomous driving, we compute the AFR for the three common tasks in CARLA. For UAV racing, we compute AFR for
race tracks of varying complexity (3, 4, or 5 anchor points describe the track). We see that our BBGAN outperforms all the baselines, and
with larger margins for higher dimensional tasks (e.g. detection). Due to the expensive computations and sequential nature of the Bayesian
baseline, we omit it for the two autonomous navigation applications. Best results are in bold.
agent uses a perception network that produces waypoints
from image input and a PID controller to produce low-level
controls. We use the general-purpose simulator for computer
vision applications, Sim4CV (Mu¨ller et al. 2018b). Here, we
change the geometry of the race course environment rather
than its appearance. We define three different race track tem-
plates with 3-5 2D anchor points, respectively. These points
describe a second order B-spline and are perturbed to gener-
ate various race tracks populated by uniformly spaced gates.
Please refer to the supplement for more details.
Experiments
BBGAN
Training. To learn the fooling distribution Pµ′ , we train
the BBGAN using a vanilla GAN model (Goodfellow et al.
2014). Both, the generator G and the discriminator D con-
sist of a MLP with 2 layers. We train the GAN following
convention, but since we do not have access to the true dis-
tribution that we want to learn (i.e. real samples), we induce
the set by randomly sampling N parameter vector samples
µ, and then picking the s worst among them (according to
the score Q). For object detection, we use N = 20000 im-
age renderings for each class (a total of 240K images). Due
to the computational cost, our dataset for the autonomous
navigation tasks comprises only N = 1000 samples. For in-
stance, to compute one data point in autonomous driving, we
need to run a complete episode that requires 15 minutes. The
induced set size is always fixed to be s = 100.
Boosting. We use a boosting strategy to improve the per-
formance of our BBGAN. Our boosting strategy simply uti-
lizes the samples generated by the previous stage adversary
Gk−1 in inducing the training set for the current stage adver-
sary Gk. This is done by adding the generated samples to Ω
before training Gk. The intuition here is that the main com-
putational burden in training the BBGAN is not the GAN
training itself, but computing the agent episodes, each of
which can take multiple hours for the case of self-driving.
For more details, including the algorithm, a mathematical
justification and more experimental results please refer to
the supplement.
Testing, Evaluation, and Baselines
To highlight the merits of BBGAN, we seek to compare it
against baseline methods, which also aim to estimate the
fooling distribution Pµ′ . In this comparative study, each
method produces M fooling/adversarial samples (250 for
object detection and 100 for self-driving and UAV racing)
based on its estimate of Pµ′ . Then, the attack fooling rate
(AFR) for each method is computed as the percentage of the
M adversarial samples that fooled the agent. To determine
whether the agent is fooled, we use a fooling rate threshold
 = 0.3 (Chen et al. 2018),  = 0.6, and  = 0.7 for object
detection, self-driving, and UAV racing, respectively. In the
following, we briefly explain the baselines. Random. We
uniformly sample random parameters µ within an admissi-
ble range that is application dependent.
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). We fit a full covariance
GMM of varying Gaussian components to estimate the dis-
tribution of the samples in the induced set Sµ′ . The vari-
ants are denoted as Gaussian (one component), GMM10%
and GMM50% (number of components as percentage of the
samples in the induced set).
Bayesian. We use the Expected Improvement (EI) Bayesian
Optimization algorithm (Jones, Schonlau, and Welch 1998)
to minimize the scoreQ for the agent. The optimizer runs for
104 steps and it tends to gradually sample more around the
global minimum of the function. We use the last N = 1000
samples to generate the induced set Sµ′ and then learn a
GMM with different Gaussian components. Finally, we sam-
ple M parameter vectors from the GMMs and report results
for the best model.
Multi-Class SVM. We bin the score Q into 5 equally sized
bins and train a multi-class SVM classifier on the complete
set Ω to predict the correct bin. We then randomly sample
parameter vectorsµ, classify them, and sort them by the pre-
dicted score. We pick M samples with the lowest Q score.
Figure 6: Visualization of the Fooling Distribution. (right): We
plot the camera positions and light source directions of 250 sam-
pled parameters in a 3D sphere around the object. (left): We show
how real photos of a toy car, captured from the same angles as ren-
dered images, confuse the YOLOV3 detector in the same way.
Gaussian Process Regression. Similar to the SVM case, we
train a Gaussian Process Regressor (Martin, Wang, and En-
glot 2018) with an exponential kernel to regress the scores
Q from the corresponding µ parameters that generated the
environment on the dataset Ω.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the AFR results for the aforementioned
baselines and our BBGAN approach across all three applica-
tions. For object detection, we show 3 out of 12 classes and
report the average across all classes. For autonomous driv-
ing, we report the results on all three driving tasks. For UAV
racing, we report the results for three different track types,
parameterized by an increasing number of 2D anchor points
(3, 4 and 5) representing µ. Our results show that we con-
sistently outperform the baselines, even the ones that were
trained on the complete set Ω rather than the smaller induced
set Sµ′ , such as the multi-class SVM and the GP regres-
sor. While some baselines perform well on the autonomous
driving application where µ consists of only 3 parameters,
our approach outperforms them by a large margin on the
tasks with higher dimensional µ (e.g. object detection and
UAV racing with 5-anchor tracks). Our boosting strategy is
very effective and improves results even further with dimin-
ishing returns for setups where the vanilla BBGAN already
achieves a very high or even the maximum success rate.
To detect and prevent mode collapse, a GAN phenomenon
where the generator collapses to generate a single point, we
do the following. (1) We visualize the Nearest Neighbor
(NN) of the generated parameters in the training set as in
Figure 7. (2) We visualize the distributions of the generated
samples and ensure their variety as in Figure 6. (3) We mea-
sure the average standard deviation per parameter dimension
to make sure it is not zero. (4) We visualize the images/tracks
created by these parameters as in Figure 5.
Analysis
Diagnosis. The usefulness of SADA lies in that it is not
only an attacking scheme using BBGAN, but also serves as
a diagnosis tool to assess the systematic failures of agents.
Truck Car Aeroplane Boat
Figure 7: Nearest Neighbor in Training: (top): generated fooling
samples by our BBGAN for 4 different classes. (bottom): the cor-
responding NN from the training set. We can see that our BBGAN
generates novel fooling parameters that are not present in training.
We perform diagnostic studies (refer to Figure 6) to identify
cases of systematic failure for the YOLOv3 detector.
Transferability. To demonstrate the transferability of the
fooling parameter distribution to the real-world, we photo-
graph toy models using a standard mobile phone camera and
use office desk lights analogous the light source of the virtual
environment. We orient the camera and the lighting source
according to the fooling distribution learned from the virtual
world. In Figure 6, we show a real-world photo of the toy car
and the corresponding rendered virtual-world image, both of
which are similarly fooled with the same erroneous class la-
bel. Please refer to the supplement for a similar analysis of
other classes, the transfer of attacks between different CAD
models and the effect of occlusion on detection.
Nearest Neighbor Visualization. In Figure 7, we visualize
the NN in the parameter space for four different generated
samples by our BBGAN. We see that the generated and the
NN in training are different for the 4 samples with L2 norm
differences of (0.76,0.60,0.81,0.56) and (378,162,99,174) in
parameter space and in image space respectively (all range
from -1 to 1). This shows that our BBGAN can generate
novel examples that fool the trained agent.
Insights and Future Work
Object Detection with YOLOV3. For most objects, top-
rear or top-front views of the object tend to fool the
YOLOV3 detector. The color of the object does not play a
significant role in fooling the detector, but usually colors that
are closer to the background color tend to be preferred by the
BBGAN samples.
Self-Driving. Weather is the least important parameter for
fooling the driving policy indicating that the policy was
trained to be insensitive to this factor. Interestingly, the
learned policy is very sensitive to slight perturbations in the
camera pose (height and pitch), indicating a systemic weak-
ness that should be ratified with more robust training.
UAV Autonomous Navigation. We observe that the UAV
fails if the track has very sharp turns. This makes intuitive
sense and the results that were produced by our BBGAN
consistently produce such tracks. While the tracks that are
only parameterized by three control points can not achieve
sharp turns, our BBGAN is still able to make the UAV agent
fail by placing the racing gates very close to each other,
thereby increasing the probability of hitting them.
Future Work. Our work can be extended to other AI agents
to test their semantic vulnerability to such attacks. This can
be used to establish more interpretable deep models and al-
low for safety-tests for AI models before deployment in real
world safety-critical applications.
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Empirical Justification for BBGAN
We want to show that as the size of the induced set |Sµ′ | →∞, learning an adversary according to the BBGAN objective
in Eq (6) converges to the fooling distribution of semantic
parameters Pµ′ defined in Eq (7).
min
Gµ
max
Dµ
LBBGAN(Gµ,Dµ, Sµ′) =
Eµ∼Sµ′ [logDµ(µ)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(6)
µ′ ∼ Pµ′ ⇔ Q(A,Eµ′) ≤ ; µ′ ∈ [µmin,µmax]d (7)
Here, the agent A interacts with the environment Eµ and
receives a score Q for a given parameter µ. The fooling
threshold is .
Empirical Proof
We use the definition of Exhaustive Search (Algorithm 3.1)
from the Audet and Hare book on derivative-free and black
box optimization (Audet and Hare 2017). In this algorithm,
we try to optimize an objective f : Rd → R defined on
a closed continuous global set Ω by densely sampling a
countable subset S = {µ1,µ2, ...,µN} ⊂ Ω. Theorem 3.1
(Audet and Hare 2017) states that as long as the exhaustive
search continues infinitely from the set S , the global solu-
tions of f can be reached. Let’s assume the global solutions
µ∗ of f exists and defined as follows.
µ∗ = arg min
µ
f (µ) s.t. µ ∈ Ω (8)
Let’s denote the best solution reached up to the sample µN
to be µbestN . If the set Sµ∗ is the set of all global solutions
µ∗, then Theorem 3.1 (Audet and Hare 2017) states that
µbestN ∈ Sµ∗ = {µ∗}, as N →∞ (9)
Now let f (µ) = max(0, Q(Eµ,A) − ) and let Ω =
[µmin,µmax], then the global solutions of the optimization:
µ∗ = arg min
µ
max(0, Q(Eµ,A)− )
s.t. µ ∈ [µmin,µmax]
(10)
satisfy the two conditions in Eq (7) as follows.
Q(A,Eµ∗) ≤ ; µ∗ ∈ [µmin,µmax]d (11)
Hence, the set of all global solutions includes all the
points in the fooling distribution:
Sµ∗ = {µ∗} = {µ′ : µ′ ∼ Pµ′} (12)
Therefore, as the sampling set size |S | → ∞, all the
points µ that lead to Q(Eµ,A) ≤ , achieve the minimum
objective in Eq (10) of zero and the set of best observed
values |{µbestN }| → ∞. This set is what we refer to as the in-
duced set Sµ′ . From Eq (9) and Eq (12), we can infer that the
induced set will include all fooling parameters as follows.
as N →∞, Sµ′ → {µ′ : µ′ ∼ Pµ′} (13)
Finally if the set Sµ′ has converged to the distribution Pµ′
and we use Sµ′ to train the BBGAN in Eq (6), then accord-
ing to proposition 2 from the original GAN paper by Good-
fellow et al. (Goodfellow et al. 2014), the adversary Gµ has
learnt the distribution Pµ′ and hence satisfies the following
equation:
arg min
Gµ
Eµ∼G[Q(A,Eµ)]
s.t. {µ : µ ∼ Gµ} = {µ′ : µ′ ∼ Pµ′}
(14)
This concludes our empirical proof for our BBGAN.
Special Cases of Generic Adversarial attacks:
In Table 3, we summarize the substitutions in the generic
adversarial attack to get different special cases of adversar-
ial attacks. In summary, the generic adversarial attack allows
for static agents (like classifiers and detectors) and dynamic
agents (like an autonomous agent acting in a dynamic envi-
ronment). It also covers the direct attack case of pixel per-
turbation on images to attack classifiers, as well as semantic
attacks that try to fool the agent in a more realistic scenario
(e.g. camera direction to fool a detector). The generic at-
tack also allows for a more flexible way to define the attack
success based on an application-specific threshold  and the
agent score Q . In the following we provide detailed expla-
nation and mathematical meaning of the substitutions.
Pixel Adversarial Attack on Image Classifiers
Probably the most popular adversarial attack in the litera-
ture is a pixel-level perturbation to fool an image classi-
fier. This attack can be thought of as a special case of our
general formulation. In this case, the agent A is a classifier
C : [0, 1]n → [l1, l2, ..., lK ] and the environment Eµ is a
dataset containing the set Φ of all images in the classifica-
tion dataset along with their respective ground truth labels,
i.e. {(xi, yi)}|Φ|i=1 and yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The softmax value
of the true class is given by lyi = maxC(xi). Parameter
µ defines the fooling noise to be added to the images (i.e.
d = n). The observation is simply an image from Φ with
noise added: ot = xi + µ for some i ∈ {1, 2, .., |Φ|}. In
classification, the environment is static with T = 1. To en-
sure the resulting image is in the admissible range, the noise
added µ should fall in the range [−xi,min, 1−xi,max], where
xi,min,xi,max are the min and max pixel value for the image
xi. The sole action a1 is simply the softmax score of the
highest scoring class label predicted byC that is not the true
class yi. Formally, a1 = maxj 6=yi C(xi + µ) = lj . The re-
ward function is R(s1,a1) = Q(C,Φ) = max(lyi − lj , 0).
Here,  = 0 for the classifier fooling to occur , which means
fooling occurs if lyi − lj ≤ 0. Using these substitutions in
the hard constraint in Eq (7) translates to the following con-
straints on the perturbed image.
lyi ≤ lj , xi + µ ∈ [0, 1]n (15)
For a single image attack, we can rewrite Eq (15) as follows:
maxC(x) ≤ max
j 6=y
C(x′) , x′ ∈ [0, 1]n (16)
We observe that the constraints in Eq (16) become the fol-
lowing constraints of the original adversarial pixel attack
formulation on a classifier C.
min
x′∈[0,1]n
d(x,x′) s.t. arg max C(x) 6= arg max C(x′)
(17)
Semantic Adversarial Attack on Object Detectors
Extending adversarial attacks from classifiers to object de-
tectors is straight-forward. We follow previous work (Chen
et al. 2018) in defining the object detector as a function F :
[0, 1]n → (RN×K ,RN×4), which takes an n-dimensional
image as input and outputs N detected objects. Each de-
tected object has a probability distribution over K class la-
bels and a 4-dimensional bounding box for the detected ob-
ject. We take the top J proposals according to their confi-
dence and discard the others. Analyzing the detector in our
general setup is similar to the classifier case. The environ-
ment Eµ is static (i.e. T = 1), and it contains all images
with ground truth detections. For simplicity, we consider one
object of interest per image (indexed by i). The observa-
tion in this case is a rendered image of an instance of ob-
ject class i, where the environment parameter µ determines
the 3D scene and how the image is rendered (e.g. the cam-
era position/viewpoint, lighting directions, textures, etc. .).
Here, the observation is defined as the rendering function
o1 : [µmin,µmax]
d → Rn. We use Blender (Blender Online
Community 2018) to render the 3D scene containing the ob-
ject and to determine its ground truth bounding box location
in the rendered image. The action a1 by the agent/detector is
simply the highest confidence score li corresponding to class
i from the top J detected boxes in o1. The final score of F
is Q(F,Eµ) = li. The attack on F is considered successful,
if li ≤ .
Semantic Adversarial Attack on Autonomous
Agents
The semantic adversarial attack of an autonomous agent can
also be represented in the general formulation of Algorithm
1 in the paper. Here, A corresponds to the navigation pol-
icy, which interacts with a parametrized environment Eµ.
The environment parameter µ ∈ Rd comprises d variables
describing the weather/road conditions, camera pose, envi-
ronment layout etc. . In this case, an observation ot is an
image as seen from the camera view of the agent at time
t. The action at produced by the navigation policy is the
set of control commands (e.g. gas and steering for a car or
throttle, pitch, roll and yaw for a UAV). The reward func-
tion R(st,at) measures if the agent successfully completes
its task (e.g. 1 if it safely reaches the target position at time
t and 0 otherwise). The episode ends when either the agent
completes its task or the maximum number of iterations T is
exceeded. Since the reward is binary, theQ score is the aver-
age reward over a certain number of runs (five in our case).
This leads to a fractional score 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1.
Substitutions of Special Cases of Adversarial Attacks
Generic Attack Variables Pixel Adversarial Attackon Image Classifiers
Semantic Adversarial Attack
on Object Detectors
Semantic Adversarial Attack
on Autonomous Agents.
Agent A
K-class classifier
C : [0, 1]n → [l1, l2, ..., lK ]
lj : the softmax value for class j
K-class object detector
F : [0, 1]n → (RN×K ,RN×4)
N : number of detected objects
self-driving policy agent A
e.g. network to regress controls
Parameters µ the pixels noiseadded on attacked image
some semantic parameters
describing the scene
e.g. camera pose, object , light
some semantic parameters
involved in the simulation
e.g. road shape , weather , camera
Parameters Size d n: the image dimension
n = h× w × c
number of semantic parameters
parameterizing Eµ
number of semantic parameters
parameterizing Eµ
Environment Eµ
dataset Φ containing all images
and their true class label
Φ = {(xi, yi)}|Φ|i=1
dataset Φ containing all images
and their true class label
simulation environment
partially described by µ
that A navigates in to reach
Parameters Range [µmin,µmax]
[−xmin, 1− xmax]
xmin,xmax are the min and max
of each pixel value in the image x
[−1, 1]d [−1, 1]d
Environment States st
static environment
st = Φ
static environment
st = Φ
the state describing the simulation
at time step t
e.g. the new position of car
Observation ot
the attacked image
after adding fooling noise
the rendered image
using the scene parameters µ
the sequence of rendered images
the A observe
during the simulation episode
Episode Size T 1 1
tstop ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...Tmax}
Tmax : max allowed time
tstop : step when success reached
Time step t 1 1
time step where agent A has to
decide on action at
given what it has observed ot
Fooling Threshold  0 fixed small fraction of 1e.g. = 0.3
fixed small fraction of 1
e.g. = 0.6
Observation ot
attacked image after added noise
= xi + µ, where x , µ ∈ Rn
the rendered image
using the scene parameters µ
sequence of rendered images A
observes during the simulation episode
Agent Actions at(ot)
predicted softmax vector
of attacked image
predicted confidence of
the true class label
steering command to move
the car/UAV in the next step
Reward Functions R(st,at)
the difference between
true and predicted softmax
predicted confidence of
the true class label
1 : if success state reached
0: if success not reached
Score Q(A,Eµ)
the difference between
true and predicted softmax
predicted confidence of
the true class label
the average sum of rewards
over five different episodes
Table 3: Special Cases of Generic Adversarial attacks: summarizing all the variable substitutions to get common adversarial
attacks.
Boosting Strategy for BBGAN
Intuition for Boosting
Inspired by the classical Adaboost meta-algorithm (Freund
and Schapire 1997), we use a boosting strategy to improve
the performance of our BBGAN trained in Section 5 of our
paper with results reported in Table 1. The boosting strat-
egy of BBGAN is simply utilizing the information learned
from one BBGAN by another BBGAN in a sequential man-
ner. The intuition is that the main computational burden in
training the BBGAN is not the GAN training but comput-
ing the agent A episodes (which can take multiple hours per
episode in the case of the self-driving experiments).
Description of Boosting for BBGANs
We propose to utilize the generator to generate samples that
can be used by the next BBGAN. We start by creating the set
Ω0 of the first stage adversary G0. We then simply add the
generated parameters µ along with their computed scores Q
to the training data of the next stage BBGAN (i.e. BBGAN-
1). We start the next stage by inducing a new induced set
S1
µ′ (that may include part or all the previous stage induced
set S0
µ′ ). However, the aim is to put more emphasis on sam-
ples that were generated in the previous stage. Hence, the
inducer in the next stage can just randomly sample N points,
compute their Q scores and add β ∗ N generated samples
from BBGAN-0 to the N random samples. The entire set is
then sorted based on the Q scores, where the lowest-scoring
s1 points that satisfy Eq (7) are picked as the induced set
S1
µ′ , s1 =
∣∣∣S1µ′ ∣∣∣. The BBGAN-1 is then trained according
to Eq (6). Here β is the boosting rate of our boosting strat-
egy which dictates how much emphasis is put on the pre-
vious stage (exploitation ratio) when training the next stage.
The whole boosting strategy can be repeated more than once.
The global set Ω of allN sampled points and the update rule
from one stage to another is described by the following two
equations:
Ω0 = {µj ∼ Uniform(µmin,µmax)}Nj=1 (18)
Ωk = Ωk−1 ∪ {µj ∼ Gk−1}bβNcj=1 (19)
These global sets Ωk constitute the basis from which the
inducer produces the induced sets Sk
µ′ . The adversaryGk of
boosting stage k uses this induced set when training accord-
ing to the BBGAN objective in Eq (6). Algorithm 2 summa-
rizes the boosting meta-algorithm for BBGAN.
Empirical proof for BBGAN Boosting
Here we want to show the effectiveness of boosting (Algo-
rithm 2) on improving the performance of BBGAN from one
stage to another. Explicitly, we want to show that the follow-
ing statement holds, under some conditions.
Eµk∼Gk [Q(A,Eµk)] ≤ Eµk−1∼Gk−1 [Q(A,Eµk−1)]
(20)
This statement says that the expected scoreQ of the sampled
parameters µk from the adversary Gk of stage (k) BBGAN
Algorithm 2: Boosting Strategy for BBGAN
Requires: environment Eµ, Agent A number of boasting
stages K, boosting rate β, initial training size N
Sample N points to form Ω0 like in Eq (18)
induce S0µ′ from Ω0
learn adversary G0 according to Eq (6)
for i← 1 to K do
update boosted training set Ωi from Ωi−1 as in Eq (19)
obtain Siµ′ from Ωi
train adversary Gi as in Eq (6)
end
Returns: last adversary GK
is bounded above by the score of the previous stage , which
indicates iterative improvement of the fooling adversary Gk
by lowering the score of the agent A and hence achieving a
better objective at the following realxation of Eq (12).
arg min
G
Eµ∼G[Q(A,Eµ)]
s.t. {µ : µ ∼ G} ⊂ {µ′ : µ′ ∼ Pµ′}
(21)
Proof of Eq (20) .
Let’s start by sampling randomN points as our initial Ω0 set
as in Eq (18) and then learn BBGAN of the first stage and
continue boosting as in Algorithm 2. Assume the following
assumption holds,∣∣Skµ∣∣ = bβNc , ∀ k ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} (22)
then by comparing the average score Q of the entire global
set Ωk at stage k (denoted simply as Q(Ωk))) with the aver-
age score of the added boosting samples from the previous
stage {µj ∼ Gk−1}bβNcj=1 as in Eq (19) (denoted simply as
Q(Gk−1)) , two possibilities emerge:
1. Exploration possibility: Q(Ωk)) ≤ Q(Gk−1) .
This possibility indicates that there is at least one new sam-
ple in the global set Ωk that are not inherited from the pre-
vious stage adversary Gk−1, which is strictly better then
Gk−1 samples with strictly lower Q score. If the assump-
tion in Eq (22)holds, then the induced set Skµ will include at
least one new parameter that is not inherited from previous
stage and hence the average score of the induced set will be
less than that of the generated by previous stage.
Q(Skµ) < Q(Gk−1) (23)
However since the BBGAN of stage k uses the induced set
Skµ for training , we expect the samples to be correlated:
Gk ∼ Skµ, and the scores to be similar as follows:
Eµk∼Gk [Q(A,Eµk)] = Q(S
k
µ) (24)
Substituting Eq (24) in Eq (23) results in the inequality
which makes the less strict inequality Eq (20)holds.
2. Exploitation possibility: Q(Ωk)) > Q(Gk−1) .
In this scenario, we don’t know for sure whether there is a
new sample in Ωk that is better than the inherited samples,
but in the worst case scenario we will get no new sample
with lower score. In either case, the assumption in Eq (22)
ensures that the new induced set Skµ is exactly the inherited
samples from Gk−1 and the following holds.
Q(Skµ) ≤ Q(Gk−1) (25)
Using the same argument as in Eq (24), we deduce that in
this exploitation scenario Eq (20) is still satisfied. Hence, we
prove that Eq (20) holds given the assumption in Eq (22).
Experimental Details for Boosting
We note that low β values do not affect the training of our
BBGAN since the induced set will generally be the same.
Hence, we use β = 0.5, a high boosting rate. For practical
reasons (computing 50% of the training data per boosting
stage is expensive) we just compute 10% of the generated
data and repeat it 5 times. This helps to stabilize the BBGAN
training and forces it to focus more on samples that have low
scores without having to evaluate the score function on 50%
of the training data.
Detailed Results
Tables 4 and 5 show the detailed results for all three appli-
cations.
Nearest Neighbor Visualization
In Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 we visualize the NN
in the parameter space for four different generated samples
by our BBGAN. We see that the generated and the NN in
training are different for the 4 samples with L2 norm differ-
ences in the caption of each figure. All pixels and parameters
range from -1 to 1. This shows that our BBGAN can gener-
ate novel examples that fool the trained agent.
Qualitative Examples
Figure 11 shows some qualitative examples for each of the
12 object classes. These images were rendered according to
parameters generated by BBGAN which fooled the detector.
Qualitative Comparison
Figure14 shows a qualitative comparison between samples
of the BBGAN distribution and different baselines distribu-
tions in the YOLOYV3 attacks experiments.
Baselines
BBGAN. To learn the fooling distribution Pµ′ , we train the
BBGAN as described in Methodology Section. For this, we
use a vanilla GAN model (Goodfellow et al. 2014). We use a
simple MLP with 2 layers for the GeneratorG and Discrim-
inator D. We train the GAN following convention, but since
we do not have access to the true distribution that we want to
learn (i.e. real samples), we induce the set by randomly sam-
pling N parameter vector samples µ, and then picking the s
worst among them (according to Q score). For object detec-
tion, we use N = 20000 image renderings for each class (a
total of 240K images), as described in the Application Sec-
tion. Due to the computational cost, our dataset for the au-
tonomous navigation tasks comprises only N = 1000 sam-
ples. For instance, to compute one data point in autonomous
driving, we need to run a complete episode that requires 15
minutes. The induced set size s is always fixed to be 100.
Random. We uniformly sample random parameters µ.
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). We fit a full covariance
GMM of varying Gaussian components to estimate the dis-
tribution of the samples in the induced set Sµ′ . The vari-
ants are denoted as Gaussian (one component), GMM10%
and GMM50% (number of components as percentage of the
samples in the induced set).
Bayesian. We use the Expected Improvement (EI) Bayesian
Optimization algorithm (Jones, Schonlau, and Welch 1998)
to minimize the score Q for the agent. The optimizer runs
for 104 steps and it tends to gradually sample more around
the global minimum of the function. So, we use the lastN =
1000 samples to generate the induced set Sµ′ and then learn
a GMM on that with different Gaussian components. Finally,
we sample M parameter vectors from the GMMs and report
results for the best model.
Multi-Class SVM. We bin the score Q into 5 equally sized
bins and train a multi-class SVM classifier on the complete
set Ω to predict the correct bin. We then randomly sample
parameter vectorsµ, classify them, and sort them by the pre-
dicted score. We pick M samples with the lowest Q score.
Gaussian Process Regression. Similar to the SVM case, we
train a Gaussian Process Regressor (Martin, Wang, and En-
glot 2018) with an exponential kernel to regress Q scores
from the corresponding µ parameters that generated the en-
vironment on the dataset Ω.
Adversarial Attack Fooling Rate across Different Classes
aeroplane bench bicycle boat bottle bus car chair diningtable motorbike train truck avg µstd
Full Set 8.64% 35.2% 14.6% 33.4% 22.5% 53.1% 39.8% 44.1% 46.1% 32.5% 58.1% 56.8% 37.1 % 0.577
Random: 11.3% 42.7% 18.6% 41.8% 28.4% 65.7% 49.9% 55.3% 56.4% 40.3% 72.8% 70.8% 46.2% 0.584
Multi-Class SVM 12.0% 45.6% 20.0% 39.6% 26.0% 64.4% 49.6% 50.4% 53.6% 45.6% 72.0% 70.8% 45.8% 0.576
GP Regression 13.6% 15.6% 17.6% 41.2% 31.6% 71.6% 51.6% 48.0% 56.0% 43.6% 69.2% 83.6% 45.26% 0.492
Gaussian 11.2% 45.6% 19.6% 41.6% 31.2% 70.4% 48.0% 56.8% 55.6% 40.4% 71.2% 72.4% 47.0% 0.548
GMM10% 14.8% 45.2% 26.0% 42.8% 34.0% 67.2% 53.2% 56.4% 54.8% 48.4% 70.4% 75.2% 49.0% 0.567
GMM50% 12.0% 44.0% 16.4% 46.4% 33.2% 66.4% 51.6% 53.2% 58.4% 46.8% 73.6% 72% 47.8% 0.573
Bayesian 9.2% 42.0% 48.0% 68.8% 32.4% 91.6% 42.0% 75.6% 58.4% 52.0% 77.2% 75.6% 56.1% 0.540
BBGAN (ours) 13.2% 91.6% 44.0% 90.0% 54.4% 91.6% 81.6% 93.2% 99.2% 45.2% 99.2% 90.8% 74.5% 0.119
BBGAN (boost) 33% 82.4% 65.8% 78.8% 67.4% 100% 67.4% 100% 90.2% 82.0% 98.4% 100% 80.5% 0.100
Table 4: Fooling rate of adversarial attacks on different classes of the augmented Pascal3D dataset. We sample 250 parameters
after the training phase of each model and sample a shape from the intended class. We then render an image according to these
parameters and run the YOLOV3 detector to obtain a confidence score of the intended class. If this score Q ≤  = 0.3, then
we consider the attack successful. The fooling rate is then recorded for that model, while µstd (the mean of standard deviations
of each parameter dimensions) is recorded for each model. We report the average over all classes. This metric represents how
varied the samples from the attacking distribution are.
Straight One Curve Navigation 3 control points 4 control points 5 control points
FR µstd FR µstd FR µstd FR µstd FR µstd FR µstd
Full Set 10.6% 0.198 19.5% 0.596 46.3% 0.604 17.0% 0.607 23.5% 0.544 15.8% 0.578
Random 8.0% 0.194 18.0% 0.623 48.0% 0.572 22.0% 0.602 30.0% 0.550 16.0% 0.552
Multi-Class SVM 96.0% 0.089 100% 0.311 100% 0.517 24.0% 0.595 30.0% 0.510 14.0% 0.980
GP Regression 100% 0.014 100% 0.268 100% 0.700 74.0% 0.486 94.0% 0.492 44.0% 0.486
Gaussian 54.0% 0.087 30.0% 0.528 64.0% 0.439 49.3% 0.573 56.0% 0.448 28.7% 0.568
GMM10% 90.0% 0.131 72.0% 0.541 98.0% 0.571 57.0% 0.589 63.0% 0.460 33.0% 0.558
GMM50% 92.0% 0.122 68.0% 0.556 100% 0.559 54.0% 0.571 60.0% 0.478 40.0% 0.543
BBGAN (ours) 100% 0.048 98.0% 0.104 98.0% 0.137 42.0% 0.161 94.0% 0.134 86.0% 0.202
BBGAN (boost) 100% 0.014 100% 0.001 100% 0.058 86.0% 0.084 98.0% 0.030 92.0% 0.003
Table 5: Autonomous Driving (CARLA) and UAV Racing Track Generation (Sim4CV). Each method produces 50 samples and
we show the fooling rate (FR) and the mean of the standard deviation per parameter. We set the fooling threshold to 0.6 and 0.7
for autonomous driving and racing track generation respectively.
Truck Truck Car Car
Figure 8: Nearest Neighbor from Training: top: generated fool-
ing samples by our BBGAN for different classes. bottom: the cor-
responding NN from the training. From left to right, L2 norm dif-
ferences in parameter space : (0.76, 0.45, 0.60, 0.50) ,L2 norm dif-
ferences in image space : (379, 218, 162, 164).
Dining Table Dining Table Dining Table Aeroplane
Figure 9: Nearest Neighbor from Training: top: generated fool-
ing samples by our BBGAN for different classes. bottom: the cor-
responding NN from the training. From left to right, L2 norm dif-
ferences in parameter space : (0.60, 0.50, 0.87, 0.47) ,L2 norm dif-
ferences in image space : (124, 125, 215, 149).
Boat Boat Boat Aeroplane
Figure 10: Nearest Neighbor from Training: top: generated
fooling samples by our BBGAN for different classes. bottom: the
corresponding NN from the training. From left to right, L2 norm
differences in parameter space : (0.56, 0.44, 0.43, 0.81) ,L2 norm
differences in image space : (174, 197, 190, 99).
Figure 11: BBGAN Qualitative Examples in Object Detection - Some sample images for each class that were rendered
according to parameters generated by BBGAN which fooled the object detector.
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Figure 12: BBGAN Distribution Visualization 1: visualizing the input parameters marginal distributions (the range is normalized from -1
to 1). Also, the Agent scores histogram for these parameters vs random parameters scores histogram are shown in the right column.
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Figure 13: BBGAN Distribution Visualization 2: visualizing the input parameters marginal distributions (the range is normalized from -1
to 1). Also, a histogram of agent scores for generated parameters and a histogram of scores for random parameters are shown in the right
column.
GP Regression GMM 50% Multi-SVM BBGAN(ours)
Figure 14: Qualitative Comparison for YOLOV3 Experiments: Comparing the distribution of the best baselines with the distribution
learned by our BBGAN. The samples shown are from the truck class experiment.
Training data
In the following we show some examples of the training data
for each of the applications.
Object Detection
Object detection is one of the core perception tasks com-
monly used in autonomous navigation. Its goal is to deter-
mine the bounding box and class label of objects in an im-
age. You Only Look Once (YOLO) object detectors popular-
ized a single-stage approach, in which the detector observes
the entire image and regresses the boundaries of the bound-
ing boxes and the classes directly (Redmon et al. 2016). This
trades off the accuracy of the detector for speed, making
real-time object detection possible.
Agent. Based on its suitability for autonomous applications,
we choose the very fast, state-of-the-art YOLOv3 object de-
tector (Redmon and Farhadi 2018) as the agent in our SADA
framework. It achieves a competitive mAP score on the MS-
COCO detection benchmark and it can run in real-time (Lin
et al. 2014).
Environment. We use Blender open source software to con-
struct a scene based on freely available 3D scenes and CAD
models . The scene was picked to be an urban scene with an
open area to allow for different rendering setups. The scene
includes one object of interest, one camera, and one main
light source all directed toward the center of the object. The
light is a fixed strength spotlight located at a fixed distance
from the object. The material of each object is semi-metallic,
which is common for the classes under consideration. The
3D collection consists of 100 shapes of 12 object classes
(aeroplane, bench, bicycle, boat, bottle, bus, car, chair, din-
ing table, motorbike, train, truck) from Pascal-3D (Xiang,
Mottaghi, and Savarese 2014) and ShapeNet (Chang et al.
2015). At each iteration, one shape from the intended class
is randomly picked and placed in the middle of the scene.
Then, the Blender rendered image is passed to YOLOV3 for
detection. Please refer to Figure 15 for some sample images
of the object detection dataset.
Environment parameters. We use eight parameters that
have shown to affect detection performance and frequently
occur in real setups (refer to Figure 22). The object is cen-
tered in the virtual scene, and the camera circles around the
object keeping the object in the center of the rendered im-
age. The parameters were normalized to [−1, 1]8 before us-
ing them for learning and testing.
Self-Driving
There is a lot of recent work in autonomous driving espe-
cially in the fields of robotics and computer vision (Franke
2017; Codevilla et al. 2018). In general, complete driving
systems are very complex and difficult to analyze or simu-
late. By learning the underlying distribution of failure cases,
our work provides a safe way to analyze the robustness of
such a complete system. While our analysis is done in simu-
lation only, we would like to highlight that sim-to-real trans-
fer is a very active research field nowadays (Sadeghi and
Levine 2017; Tobin et al. 2017).
Agent. We use an autonomous driving agent (based on CIL
(Codevilla et al. 2018)), which was trained on the envi-
ronment Eµ with default parameters. The driving-policy
was trained end-to-end to predict car controls given an in-
put image and is conditioned on high-level commands (e.g.
turn right at the next intersection) in order to facilitate au-
tonomous navigation.
Environment. We use the recent CARLA driving simulator
(Dosovitskiy et al. 2017), the most realistic open-source ur-
ban driving simulator currently available. We consider the
three common tasks of driving in a straight line, complet-
ing one turn, and navigating between two random points.
The score is measured as the average success of five pairs of
start and end positions. Figure 16 shows some images of the
CARLA (Dosovitskiy et al. 2017) simulation environment
used for the self-driving car experiments.
Environment parameters. Since experiments are time-
consuming, we restrict ourselves to three parameters, two of
which pertain to the mounted camera viewpoint and the third
controls the appearance of the environment by changing the
weather setting (e.g. ’clear noon’, ’clear sunset’, ’cloudy af-
ter rain’, etc.). As such, we construct an environment by
randomly perturbing the position and rotation of the default
camera along the z-axis and around the pitch axis respec-
tively, and by picking one of the weather conditions. Intu-
itively, this helps measure the robustness of the driving pol-
icy to the camera position (e.g. deploying the same policy in
a different vehicle) and to environmental conditions. Figure
17 visualizes the distribution of the training data.
UAV Racing
In recent years, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) racing has
emerged as a new sport where pilots compete in navigat-
ing small UAVs through race courses at high speeds. Since
this is a very interesting research problem, it has also been
picked up by the robotics and vision communities (Kauf-
mann et al. 2018).
Agent. We use a fixed agent to autonomously fly through
each course and measure its success as percentage of gates
passed (Mu¨ller et al. 2018a). If the next gate was not reached
within 10 seconds, we reset the agent at the last gate. We also
record the time needed to complete the course. The agent
uses a perception network that produces waypoints from im-
age input and a PID controller to produce low-level controls.
Environment. We use the general-purpose simulator for
computer vision applications, Sim4CV (Mu¨ller et al.
2018b). Sim4CV is not only versatile but also photo-realistic
and provides a suitable environment for UAV racing. Figure
18 shows some images of the Sim4CV simulator used for
the UAV racing application.
Environment parameters. We change the geometry of the
race course environment. We define three different race track
templates with 3-5 2D anchor points, respectively. These
points describe a second order B-spline and are perturbed to
generate various race tracks populated by uniformly spaced
gates. Figures 19, 20 and 21 show some samples from the
UAV datasets.
Figure 15: Training Data for YOLOV3 Experiment - Some sample images from the dataset used for object detection with
YOLOV3. Note that in the actual dataset each object has a random color regardless of its class. For clarity we uniformly color
each class in this figure.
Figure 16: Environment for Self-driving - Some samples of the CARLA (Dosovitskiy et al. 2017) simulator environment.
Figure 17: Training Data for Self-driving - Visualization of training data distribution for 2 parameters (camera height, camera
pitch angles) .
Figure 18: Environment for UAV Racing - Some samples of the Sim4CV (Mu¨ller et al. 2018b) simulator environment.
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Figure 19: Training Data for 3-Anchors UAV Racing - Some sample tracks from the dataset with 3 control points.
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Figure 20: Training Data for 4-Anchors UAV Racing - Some sample tracks from the dataset with 4 control points.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
x
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
y
Control Points
Center
Inner
Outer
Gates
Figure 21: Training Data for 5-Anchors UAV Racing - Some sample tracks from the dataset with 5 control points.
Analysis
Diagnosis
To identify weaknesses and cases that results in systematic
failure for the YOLOv3 detector, we fix some semantic pa-
rameters and attack the others. We conduct two different
case studies. The first one involves the camera view-point
and light direction; these have the largest impact in deter-
mining the pixel values of the final image. The second case
study examines occlusion, which is one of the most com-
mon causes of detection failure. In both cases, we focus on
two classes that are relevant in the autonomous driving ap-
plication: cars and motorbikes. Since we have several 3D
models for each class, we include the effect of model shapes
in the analysis. We use roughly sampled models with ho-
mogeneous texturing (obtained from the training in Section)
as well as detailed fully-textured models. This also has the
nice side-effect to show how well our insights transfer to
more realistic renderings and ultimately the real world. In
total, we consider five different scenarios per case. Scenario
1: simple car, Scenario 2: detailed car, Scenario 3: simple
motorbike, Scenario 4: detailed motorbike 1, Scenario 5:
detailed motorbike 2. We use these scenarios for both cases.
Case 1: View point. We restrict the number of parameters to
4 (φcam, θcam, φlight, φlight), and fix the object class and RGB
colors (pure blue). Figures 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 show qual-
itative results for samples generated by learning a BBGAN
on each scenario in the view-point case. Figures 23 and 24
visualize the learned distribution in scenario 3 and scenario
5 and some examples of transferability to real world.
Case 2: Occlusion. Since occlusion plays an important role
in object misdetection, we introduce an occlusion experi-
ment. Here, we investigate how occlusion (e.g. by a pole)
can result in failure of a detector (e.g. from which view
point). Therefore, we include the camera viewpoint angles
(φcam, θcam) and introduce a third parameter to control hori-
zontal shift of a pole that covers 15% of the rendered image
and moves from one end to another. The pole keeps a fixed
distance to the camera and is placed between the camera and
the object. Figures 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 show qualitative re-
sults for samples generated by learning a BBGAN on each
scenario in the occlusion case.
Transferability
Across Shape Variations.
We use the same scenarios as above to construct transferabil-
ity experiments. The goal is to validate generalization capa-
bilities of the learned fooling distribution from one scenario
to another. Also, it shows what role the model shape plays
with regard to the strength of the learned attacks. Tables 6
and 7 show the transferability of the adversarial attacks for
Case 1 and Case 2. We see that most attacks transfer to new
scenarios that are similar, indicating the generalization of
the learned fooling distribution. However, the attacks that
were learned on more detailed CAD models transfer better to
generic less detailed models (e.g. PASCAL3D(Xiang, Mot-
taghi, and Savarese 2014) and ShapeNet(Chang et al. 2015)
models).
z𝜽𝒄𝒂𝒎
𝜽𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕
∅𝒄𝒂𝒎
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Figure 22: Visualization view point parameters. These parame-
ters are used in the first analysis experiment. The object class and
RGB colors are fixed.
To validate generalization capabilities of the learned fool-
ing distribution, we learn this distribution from samples
taken from one setup and then test it on another. Table 6
shows that adversarial distributions learned from detailed
textured models transfer better (i.e. maintain similar AFR
after transferring to the new setup) than those learned from
rough ones from Pascal3D (Xiang, Mottaghi, and Savarese
2014) and ModelNet (Wu et al. 2015). This observation is
consistent with that of (Alcorn et al. 2019).
original attacks transferred attacks
scenario # BBGAN random to scenario # BBGAN random
1 96.4% 70.4% 2 0.0% 26.0%
2 88.8% 26.0% 1 90.4% 70.4%
3 92.0% 53.2% 4 0.8% 10.4%
3 92.0% 53.2% 5 3.2% 13.2%
4 90.8% 10.4% 3 95.2% 53.2%
5 16.8% 13.2% 3 64.8% 53.2%
Table 6: Case 1: view-point attack transferability: Attack
Fooling Rate for sampled attacks on each scenario and trans-
ferred attacks from one scenario to another. Random attacks
for each scenario are provided for reference.
original attacks transferred attacks
scenario # BBGAN random to scenario # BBGAN random
1 96.8% 58.0% 2 36.0% 32.4%
2 94.8% 32.4% 1 77.2% 58.0%
3 95.6% 52.0% 4 90.8% 37.2%
3 95.6% 52.0% 5 94.0% 39.6%
4 99.2% 37.2% 3 100.0% 52.0%
5 100.0% 39.6% 3 100.0% 52.0%
Table 7: Case 2: occlusion attack transferability. Attack
Fooling Rate for sampled attacks on each scenarios and also
for transferred attacks from one scenario to another. Random
attacks for each scenario are put for reference
Virtual to Real World.
To demonstrate the transferability of the fooling parameter
distribution to the real world, we photograph a toy motor-
bike, similar to the 3D model we are attacking. We use a mo-
bile phone camera and an office spotlight to replace the light
source in the virtual environment. The photos are taken un-
der different camera views and lighting directions (uniform
sampling). We also take photos based on samples from the
distribution learned by the BBGAN. We apply the YOLOv3
detector on these images and observe the confidence score
for the ‘motorbike’ class of interest. On the samples gener-
ated from the BBGAN distribution, the attack fooling rate is
21% compared to only 4.3% when picking a random view-
point. In Figures 23 and 24, we visualize the fooling distri-
bution generated by our BBGAN and provide some corre-
sponding real-world images.
Visualization. In Figures 23 and 24, we visualize of the
fooling distribution generated by our BBGAN in the two
previous experiments (Section). We also include some real-
world images captured according to the parameters gener-
ated by the BBGAN.
Insights Gained by BBGAN Experiments
Object Detection with YOLOV3
In our YOLOV3 experiments, we consistently found that for
most objects top rear or top front views of the object are
fooling the YOLOV3 detector. Furthermore, the light angle
which will result in highest reflection off the surface of the
object also results in higher fooling rates for the detector.
The color of the object does not play a big role in fooling the
detector, but usually colors that are closer to the background
color tend to be preferred by the BBGAN samples (as shown
in the qualitative examples). From the analysis in Section
of transferability of these attacks, we note that attacks on
more detailed CAD shapes and models transfer better to less
detailed shapes, but the opposite is not true.
Self-driving cars
In our experiments we found that weather is the least im-
portant parameter for determining success. This is probably
due to the fact that the driving policy was trained on mul-
tiple weather conditions. This allows for some generaliza-
tion and robustness to changing weather conditions. How-
ever, the driving policy was trained with a fixed camera. We
observe, that the driving policy is very sensitive to slight per-
turbations of the camera pose (height and pitch).
UAV Autonomous Navigation
We observe that the UAV fails if the track has very sharp
turns. This makes intuitive sense and the results that were
produced by our BBGAN consistently produce such tracks.
For the tracks that are only parameterized by three control
points it is difficult to achieve sharp turns. However, our BB-
GAN is still able to make the UAV agent fail by placing the
racing gates very close to each other, thereby increasing the
probability of hitting them.
Camera azimuth (-180,180)
Camera pitch (0,50)
Light azimuth wrt camera 
(-180,180)
Light pitch (0,90)
BBGAN
Random
Figure 23: Analysis: Visualization of the Fooling Distribution.
We fix the object to be a car and fix the distance to the camera and
train a BBGAN to learn the fooling camera and light source angles
to fool the YOLOV3 detector. Top: on the right we plot the camera
positions and light source directions of 250 sampled parameters in
a 3D sphere around the object. On the left we show how taking real
photos from the same rendered angles of some toy car confuses
the YOLOV3 detector as the rendered image. Bottom: on the right
we visualize the distribution of parameters normalized from (-1,1),
while on the left we visualize the histogram of scores (0 to 1) of
the learned parameters distribution vs random distribution.
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Figure 24: Analysis: Visualization of the Fooling Distribution.
We fix object to be a motorbike and fix the distance to the camera
and train a BBGAN to learn the fooling camera and light source
angles to fool the YOLOV3 detector. Top: on the right we plot the
camera positions and light source directions of 250 sampled pa-
rameters in a 3D sphere around the object. On the left we show
how taking real photos from the same rendered angles of some toy
motorbike confuses the YOLOV3 detector as the rendered image.
Bottom: on the right we visualize the distribution of parameters nor-
malized from (-1,1), while on the left we visualize the histogram of
scores (0 to 1) of the learned parameters distribution vs random
distribution.
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